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Prosecuting Inequitable Conduct 
Kyle R. Kroll† 
In 2004, South Korean researcher Hwang Woo-suk made 
scientific headlines; he published a groundbreaking paper in Sci-
ence, one of the premier scientific journals, detailing his creation 
of the world’s first cloned human embryos and stem cells.1 Later 
that year, he published another paper in Science claiming that 
he had created “human embryonic stem cells genetically 
matched to specific patients.”2 He even filed for a U.S. patent on 
the method for creating stem cell lines.3 Many leading scientists 
considered this advancement the next step in the development 
of cures for diseases such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, and can-
cer.4 Despite the auspicious nature of Woo-suk’s discovery, 
though, some were not convinced. The doubters suspected that 
Woo-suk’s success was too rapid, and they began wading through 
Woo-suk’s published data. They found significant evidence of 
fabrication.5 By 2006, Woo-suk was discredited and stripped of 
 
†  Kyle R. Kroll is an attorney practicing in the areas of antitrust, unfair 
competition, and intellectual property litigation. He is a 2016 graduate of the 
University of Minnesota Law School and a former editor for Minnesota Law Re-
view. Special thanks to Andrew Mohring and to friends, peers, and colleagues 
who provided helpful feedback and advice. The views, thoughts, and opinions 
expressed in this article belong solely to the author, and are not those of the 
author ’s employer, organization, committee, or other group or individual. Cop-
yright © 2018 by Kyle R. Kroll. 
 1. Choe Sang-Hun, Disgraced Cloning Expert Convicted in South Korea, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/world/asia/ 
27clone.html. 
 2. Id. 




 4. See Sang-Hun, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
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his license to research in South Korea—his name no longer em-
blematic of innovation, but instead fraud and deceit.6 
In the aftermath of Woo-suk’s downfall, his patent applica-
tion remained. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) granted the patent in 2012.7 Those who remembered 
Woo-suk’s fraud were surprised, lamenting that the USPTO 
should not have granted the patent because Woo-suk’s applied-
for stem cell line and method for creating it was “the subject of 
his fraud.”8 Regardless of this criticism, the patent has not been 
invalidated.9 
Woo-suk’s story is not unique,10 but his fraud is especially 
egregious. Each year, courts find that applicants have defrauded 
the USTPO in a variety of ways—though, such findings are un-
common.11 Although it is unclear just how prevalent knowing 
and willful patent fraud is, as the number of patent applications 
each year increases in number,12 finding ways to deter and curb 
such fraud increases in importance. Fraudulent procurement of 
patents negatively affects not only true innovation, but also the 
American economy. 
The USPTO, as the agency tasked with examining patent 
applications, is the first line of defense against patent fraud. But 
some point to the USPTO’s examination policies as potentially 
inviting fraud. By way of background, the USPTO’s patent ex-
aminers (those who review applications) are evaluated on a 
 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Andrew Pollack, Disgraced Scientist Granted U.S. Patent for Work 
Found to Be Fraudulent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/02/15/science/disgraced-scientist-granted-us-patent-for-work-found-to-be 
-fraudulent.html. 
 8. Matt Levy, USPTO Issues Patent to Fraud, PATENT PROGRESS (Feb. 19, 
2014), http://www.patentprogress.org/2014/02/19/uspto-issues-patent-fraud. 




 10. See, e.g., Ann Steffora Mutschler, Aptix Founder Sentenced to 17 Years 
for Perjury, Obstruction of Justice, EDN NETWORK (Jan. 9, 2007), https://www 
.edn.com/electronics-news/4315541/Aptix-founder-sentenced-to-17-years-for 
-perjury-obstruction-of-justice. 
 11. See, e.g., Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2017); TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 
1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 16 F. 
Supp. 3d 385, 398 (D. N.J. 2014). 
 12. See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–2015, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated 
June 15, 2016). 
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quota system, which encourages them to examine as many ap-
plications as possible.13 Some commentators have questioned 
whether this policy has turned the USPTO into a rubber-stamp 
institution.14 In the meantime, the number of patent applica-
tions and grants since 2000 has almost tripled.15 This has led to 
an even greater need for the USPTO to quickly accept or reject 
patents so as not to fall behind.16 The cycle is further incentiv-
ized by the increasing economic and financial value of patents.17 
And it is also enabled by the difficulty, high cost, and/or impos-
sibility of investigating every representation made by patent ap-
plicants. The USPTO simply does not have the wherewithal to 
investigate every claim of inventorship, utility, novelty, and 
other issues related to patentability. Thus, along with the im-
portant interests at stake, the complexities of patent law, and 
the USPTO’s current weaknesses combine to create a situation 
in which fraud is less likely to be identified and thwarted. 
As demonstrated in this exposition, it is not surprising that 
patents are procured by fraud. But recognition of this problem 
does nothing to solve it because, increasingly, the value of a pa-
tent is not in its ingenuity, but instead its threat-value. Simply 
threatening patent infringement, regardless of the patent’s va-
lidity, frequently leads to settlement due to the extremely high 
cost to litigate infringement suits.18 This has led to the onset of 
the often-criticized “patent trolls” and other entities, whose pri-
mary purpose is to monetize patents and so by enforcing existing 
 
 13. See Gene Quinn, Suggestions for Fixing the US Patent System, IP-
WATCHDOG (July 30, 2009), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/07/30/ 
suggestions-for-fixing-the-us-patent-system/id=4725. 
 14. See, e.g., Daniel Nazer, Magical Drug Wins EFF’s Stupid Patent of the 
Month, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2014/08/magical-drug-wins-effs-stupid-patent-month. 
 15. See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, supra note 12. 
 16. See generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a 
Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 676 (2015) (“Our results suggest that 
the inability of the PTO to finally rid itself of an application biases it toward 
granting patents.”). 
 17. See K.N.C., Valuing Patents: Doing the Maths, ECONOMIST (Aug. 17, 
2011), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/08/valuing-patents. 
 18. See Gene Quinn, Extortion Patent Style: Small Business in the Troll 
Crosshairs, IPWATCHDOG (May 24, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/05/ 
24/extortion-patent-style-small-business-in-the-troll-crosshairs/id=17425; see 
also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVA-
TION 9 (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_ 
report.pdf (listing average infringement litigation costs). 
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patent rights through suits and threats to sue.19 Threat moneti-
zation is common and often costly to defendants.20 
Most patent law scholars argue that the patent system’s 
problems can be addressed by reforms to USPTO rules, remedies 
and attorney’s fees, and the entire patent system.21 But scholars 
have not considered whether criminal law can or should be used 
to address fraudulent application behavior. Since 2013, however, 
27 states have made it a crime to assert patent infringement in 
bad faith, indicating that there is a general impression that pa-
tent abuses have increased in number and warrant criminal 
punishment.22 
This Essay asks whether applicants who commit fraud when 
applying for a patent—called “inequitable conduct”—can or 
should be prosecuted (in the criminal sense) under federal crim-
inal law, in line with growing state-law trends toward criminal-
izing harmful patent-related behavior. Part I provides a back-
ground on patents, inequitable conduct, and the doctrines courts 
have employed to address such fraud. Part II analyzes whether 
a patent applicant who commits inequitable conduct could be 
held criminally responsible under existing federal criminal stat-
utes. Finally, Part III concludes by asking whether inequitable 
should be prosecuted, even if existing federal crimes are applica-
ble. Although extending federal criminal law to patent abuses 
may appear harsh, it would be justified in cases involving fla-
grant and willful fraud. 
 
 19. See generally Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the For-
est for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013). 
 20. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18, at 9–10. 
 21. E.g., Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect Deployment 
of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. 
& TECH. L.J. 109, 123 (2012). 
 22. Eileen Hyde, State and Federal Attempts to Combat Bad Faith Asser-
tion of Patents, BAKER BOTTS (Apr., 2016), http://www.bakerbotts.com/ideas/ 
publications/2016/04/ip-report-e-hyde. 
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I.  BACKGROUND ON PATENTS, INEQUITABLE 
CONDUCT, AND FRAUD ON THE USPTO   
A. PATENT BASICS 
Patents may be granted for any “process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof.”23 However, in order to be patentable, the in-
vention must also be novel, non-obvious, and useful.24 Generally 
speaking, this requires that an invention be new and creative, 
involve more ingenuity and skill than held by an average person, 
and have a specific, realizable, and substantial benefit.25 Every 
patent application must also accurately list the person(s) who 
invented the claimed concept.26  
In addition to patentability requirements, there are multi-
ple bars to patentability. For example, the “on-sale bar” pre-
cludes a patent grant if there was a definite sale or offer to sell 
the invention more than one year before the effective filing date 
of an application, and the subject matter of the sale or offer to 
sell fully anticipates the claimed invention or would render the 
claimed invention obvious.27 The same is true if the invention 
was in “public use” or publicly available more than one year prior 
to the effective filing date.28 These bars, along with the other 
technical requirements for applying for patent, not only make it 
more difficult to obtain a patent, but also render patent applica-
tions more complex, leaving more room for error—as well as chi-
canery. Whether an idea is unpatentable because of these bars 
or failure to meet other requirements sometimes depends on the 
existence of non-public facts, to which patent examiners often do 
not have access unless the facts are disclosed by applicants.  
A patent’s power is, quite simply, the right to exclude all 
others from “making, using, or selling in the United States the 
invention claimed by the patent for twenty years.”29 Most schol-
ars agree that this statutory grant of monopoly power benefits 
 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 24. See id. at § 101–103. 
 25. See, e.g., Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance 
with the Utility Requirement, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ 
mpep/s2107.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 26. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 115(a), 116(a). 
 27. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). 
 28. See id. 
 29. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE 
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 2 (2003). 
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society at large because it incentivizes and facilitates innova-
tion.30 The principal way in which the patent grant does this is 
by trading market-wide exclusivity for the public disclosure of 
new and useful ideas. Patents thus enable inventors to recoup 
costs and potentially make a profit, while enabling other inven-
tors to learn from new discoveries. This, in turn, facilitates li-
censing and reduces duplicative research and development.31 
First to file rights and the monopoly grant also encourage com-
petition between inventors to innovate quickly.32 Scholars, econ-
omists, and legislators frequently credit these trade-offs as a rea-
son for the United States’ technological dominance. 
Patent rights are primarily enforced through litigation,33 
and in the past decade, the number of patent infringement suits 
has increased dramatically.34 There are a variety of reasons for 
this increase, one of which is product complexity. Advanced 
gadgets rely on thousands of patents at once.35 It is therefore 
easy for a high-tech product to infringe on at least one patent, 
perhaps inadvertently. This is especially the case because a 
product need only practice one of the many “claims” in a patent 
for there to be actionable infringement.36 Companies are also 
constantly deriving new inventions from past ideas, leading to 
sometimes-overlapping patent rights and increasing the likeli-
hood of infringement. This likelihood also increases with the is-
suance of sometimes weak or invalid patents.37 
 
 30. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS: 
A POPULIST VISION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1–2 (2008). 
 31. Id. 
 32. E.g., William Wynne, Patent Wars, Trolls, and Privateers: Killing Inno-
vation, Death by 1,000 Lawsuits, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1009, 1014 (2013). 
 33. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1)–(2), 271 (2012). 
 34. See Amy G. O’Toole, Recent Governmental Initiatives and Findings Ad-
dressing NPE Litigation—Are There Any Judicial Solutions?, in NON-PRACTIC-
ING ENTITY PATENT LITIGATION 2013: PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES 
67 (R. David Donoghue ed., 2013). 
 35. Wynne, supra note 33, at 1017–18. Commentators estimate that royal-
ties paid by smartphone manufacturers may exceed $120 for every device. See 
Thibault Schrepel, Patent Privateering—Patents as Weapons, CTR. FOR POL’Y 
STUDIES (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.cps.org.uk/blog/q/date/2014/10/28/ 
patent-privateering-patents-as-weapons. 
 36. E.g., Bayer AG v. Elan Pharma. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1247 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 37. See generally Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 16; Douglas R. Nemec 
& Scott M. Flanz, After Period of High Invalidation Rates, New US Patent Chal-
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Some competitors also use patent litigation as a competitive 
tactic.38 This form of litigation is most common in industries 
built primarily on intellectual property (e.g., high-tech indus-
tries), where the innovation is incremental and patented ideas 
are more likely to be interchangeable.39 Strategic patent litiga-
tion and threats thereof tend to generate substantial cash for pa-
tent holders, thereby increasing the demand for, and overall 
value of, patents.40 Thus, when competitors use invalid patents 
against rivals, they “undermine both the patent system and the 
competitive marketplace. They raise entry costs and delay mar-
ket entry, deter customers and business partners from contract-
ing with new entrants, cause consumers to pay artificially in-
flated prices, and hurt innovation. This is true even when other 
firms know or suspect the patent of being invalid.”41 
B. APPLYING FOR A PATENT 
The patent application process entails, among other things, 
determining what kind of application to file, preparing an appli-
cation, filing the application over the internet or through the 
mail, and examination by the USPTO.42 
Although there are several different kinds of patents and 
applications, the typical, “non-provisional” application generally 
includes an abstract, a specification, a description, patent 
claims, drawings, and an oath of inventorship.43 The abstract 
 
 38. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives 
and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 
1587–88 (2009); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Com-
petitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512 (2003); Charles 
Duan, Big Businesses Are Filing Frivolous Patent Lawsuits To Stifle Innovative 
Small Competitors, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
realspin/2014/02/24/big-businesses-are-filing-frivolous-patent-lawsuits-to 
-stifle-innovative-small-competitors. 
 39. See Chien, supra note 38, at 1589. 
 40. See, e.g., Patent Litigation: Litigating Against a Non-Practicing Entity, 
Practical Law Practice Note 5-553-7946 [hereinafter “Patent Litigation Practice 
Note”]. 
 41. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust, Inequitable Conduct, and the Intent to 
Deceive the Patent Office, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 323, 325 (2011). 
 42. See Patent Process Overview, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents- 
getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/utility-patent/patent 
-process-0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 43. See Nonprovisional (Utility) Patent Application Filing Guide, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent 
-applications/nonprovisional-utility-patent#heading-4 (last visited Apr. 2, 
2018). 
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provides a brief description of the invention.44 The specification 
(and description) provides information that is needed to enable 
individuals skilled in the art or science (to which the claimed in-
vention pertains) to make and use the invention.45 The descrip-
tion distinguishes the new invention from past developments.46 
The claims set forth the scope of a patent’s protection using spe-
cific language and terms.47 Drawings necessary to understand 
the subject matter being patented are required and must show 
every feature of the claimed invention.48 Finally, the oath of in-
ventorship is a formal statement made under oath that the 
claimed inventors are the sole or joint inventor(s).49 
If the USPTO denies an application, applicants may request 
reconsideration and conduct administrative appeals.50 The pro-
cess of practicing before the USPTO while applying for a patent 
is referred to as “prosecution.”51 Once granted, the patent relates 
back to the effective filing date.52 
After the USPTO issues a patent, patent assignees (owners) 
have the exclusive right to prevent others from practicing the 
invention claimed in the patent. They may send demand letters 
and file lawsuits to enforce this right. In response, accused in-
fringers may defend themselves in court or file a request for re-
examination or inter partes review with the USPTO.53 The 
USPTO’s administrative procedures allow defendants to chal-
lenge the validity of a patent (based on patentability require-
ments). Either kind of challenge (whether through litigation or 
administrative proceedings) can be prohibitively expensive.54 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. The irony in relation to this Essay’s topic is not lost on the author. 
 52. The effective filing date is, generally speaking, the filing date of the pa-
tent application claiming the invention or the filing date of an earlier priority 
application to which a patent or application is entitled to a right of priority. See 
35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119, 120; Amanda K. Murphy, Effective Filing Date: What is 
That Again?, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail 
.aspx?g=3f811784-1fb2-48b2-a228-0c87c3e230ca. 
 53. Gene Quinn, What To Do If You Are Sued For Patent Infringement, IP-
WATCHDOG (June 11, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/06/02/what 
-to-do-sued-for-patent-infringement/id=17538/. 
 54. In addition to the hundreds of thousands of dollars it may cost to defend 
a suit, see EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 20, at 9, the mere fee to 
request review by the USPTO can exceed $10,000. See USPTO Fee Schedule, 
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C. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND FRAUD ON THE PATENT OFFICE 
Patent attorneys must be licensed by the patent bar in order 
to assist inventors with any work before the USPTO.55 These at-
torneys are held to the USPTO’s Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which largely mirror the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct.56 In particular, ABA Rule 3.3 and USPTO Rule 11.303, re-
garding candor toward a tribunal, requires that the lawyer “not 
knowingly . . . make any false statements of fact or law or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made 
to the tribunal by the [lawyer].” The lawyer must also not “[o]ffer 
evidence that the [lawyer] knows to be false.”57 
The above ethical provisions supplement the affirmative 
duty, within USPTO Rule 56, to disclose information that is ma-
terial to patentability at the time an application is made and 
during examination.58 Importantly, this duty applies not only to 
patent attorneys, but also inventors and any other “person who 
is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the 
application.”59 It makes intuitive sense to impose this duty on 
patent applicants and the agents and attorneys who assist them 
because such individuals, not USPTO examiners, are most likely 
to know of any relevant prior art. 
Material information may relate to any of the patentability 
requirements or bars. For example, material information fre-
quently includes “prior art,” which is any information showing 
the state of invention in a given field (potentially non-invalidat-
ing prior art) or showing that the invention is already available 
to the public, has been sold, or has already been patented, any-
where in the world (potentially invalidating prior art).60 Invali-
dating prior art may show that the applied-for invention lacks 
novelty, one of the elements of patentability.61 It could also dis-
close the applicability of certain bars to patentability. 
 
USPTO (Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and 
-payment/uspto-fee-schedule. 
 55. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.5–9 (2008). 
 56. See USPTO, ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT VS. 
USPTO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2013), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/ 
boards/oed/AbavsUSPTO.pdf (comparing both rules by incorporating changes 
within 78 Fed. Reg. 20179 (2013)). 
 57. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.303 (2013). 
 58. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012). 
 59. Id. § 1.56(c). 
 60. See generally Gene Quinn, What is Prior Art?, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 2, 
2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/10/02/what-is-prior-art/id=12677. 
 61. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
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Intentional and knowing failure to comply with the duty of 
disclosure is referred to as “inequitable conduct” or “fraud on the 
patent office” because it results in the issuance of an invalid pa-
tent procured by false statements or material omissions.62 The 
doctrine of inequitable conduct is technically an affirmative de-
fense to patent infringement. If a patent applicant committed in-
equitable conduct, either through an intentional misrepresenta-
tion or violation of the duty of disclosure, with respect to any of 
a patent’s claims, all of the claims are invalid.63 This harsh pen-
alty is rooted in equitable principles—such as the doctrine of un-
clean hands—and is justifiable in view of the important public 
interests at stake.64 “The far reaching social and economic con-
sequences of a patent . . . give the public a paramount interest in 
seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within their legiti-
mate scope.”65 
Due to the strength and breadth of the inequitable conduct 
defense, defendants are required to prove by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that (1) the patent holder had specific intent to de-
ceive through misrepresentations or omissions, and (2) the infor-
mation that was the subject of the deception was material.66 
Prior to 2011, courts were divided as to whether intent could in-
clude negligent conduct and the exact definition of materiality, 
sometimes employing a sliding-scale test. But in Therasense, the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the law.67 
Prior to Therasense, there was a strong sense among the pa-
tent bar and federal courts that assertions of inequitable conduct 
were too widespread. As the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
itself put it, “the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost 
 
 62. E.g., 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 
LAW § 15:2 (2016); Dennis Crouch, Inequitable Conduct: Federal Circuit Places 
Another Nail in the Coffin, PATENTLYO (Sept. 14, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/ 
patent/2012/09/inequitable-conduct-federal-circuit-places-another-nail-in-the 
-coffin.html. 
 63. See, e.g., Fraud, Inequitable Conduct, or Violation of Duty of Disclosure 
Affects All Claims, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2016 
.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018); cf. Allan Bullwinkel, Specifically Fighting In-
equitable Conduct, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 349, 354 (2011). 
 64. Id. at 359. 
 65. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1361 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1970) 
(citations omitted)). 
 66. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 67. Id. at 1290. 
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every major patent case has become an absolute plague.”68 Not-
ing that accusations of equitable conduct are only factual “in but 
a small percentage of the cases” and therefore “destroy” respect 
for the patent bar’s integrity, the Federal Circuit lamented that 
unsupported charges are “negative contribution[s] to the rightful 
administration of justice.”69 The Federal Circuit in Therasense 
thus sought to curb the popular and “significant litigation strat-
egy” of charging inequitable conduct when there was no known 
basis for doing so.70 The Federal Circuit also sought to reduce 
the burden the doctrine imposes on courts and on the USPTO 
(i.e., due to frequent charges of inequitable conduct, patent pros-
ecutors began to “bury PTO examiners with a deluge of prior art 
references,” making examination more difficult).71 
With this understanding, the Federal Circuit held that a 
gross negligence “should have known” standard is insufficient to 
satisfy the intent element of inequitable conduct.72 Now, in all 
cases, there must be a deliberate decision to misrepresent or 
withhold information.73 However, specific intent can still be in-
ferred from indirect and circumstantial evidence, so long as in-
tent to deceive is “the single most reasonable inference available 
to be drawn from the evidence.”74 
The Therasense court also elevated the materiality stand-
ard, requiring a but-for showing; information is material if the 
USPTO (through its examiners) would not have allowed the 
claim had it been aware of the information.75 But in cases of af-
firmative, egregious misrepresentations, the conduct is always 
considered material; this exception strikes a “necessary balance 
between encouraging honesty before the [USPTO] and prevent-
ing unfounded accusations of inequitable conduct.”76 
 
 68. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288. 
 71. Id. at 1289. 
 72. Id. at 1290. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1290–91. 
 75. Id. at 1291–92. 
 76. Id. Following Therasense, the USPTO issued a notice of proposed rule-
making to adopt the but-for materiality standard for violations of Rule 56, so as 
to “harmonize the materiality standard for the duty of disclosure before the 
[USPTO] with the . . . standard . . . for establishing inequitable conduct before 
the courts.” Revision of the Duty to Disclose Information in Patent Applications 
and Reexamination Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 74987, 74988 (Oct. 28, 2016) (to 
be codified in 37 C.F.R. Part 1). 
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With these holdings, the Therasense court heightened the 
standards for showing inequitable conduct but kept the doc-
trine’s relatively broad concept of fraud. As compared with com-
mon law fraud, for example, the current inequitable conduct con-
cept includes not only intentional misrepresentations, but also 
partial- and half-disclosures, as well as intentional omissions.77 
The conduct that may form the basis of an inequitable conduct 
defense includes that of perjury, manufacturing of false evi-
dence, suppression of evidence, and deliberate non-disclosure of 
information.78 
Because the Federal Circuit establishes controlling prece-
dent with regard to patent cases, Therasense’s holdings are ap-
plied nationwide. Commentators are critical of the new standard 
for a variety of reasons, such as its disconnect from prior prece-
dent and USPTO guidance and rules.79 But despite this, no cer-
tiorari petition involving inequitable conduct has been granted 
by the Supreme Court for over 70 years.80 
II.  APPLICATION OF FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
TO INEQUITABLE CONDUCT   
This Part reviews the basic elements of relevant federal 
crimes and explores whether inequitable conduct falls within 
each crime’s scope. The Part discusses perjury, false statement, 
obstruction of justice, and mail and wire fraud—crimes that, by 
their nature, would seem to prohibit inequitable conduct. 
A. PERJURY 
At first glance, it is axiomatic that inequitable conduct, 
which involves either material misrepresentations or intentional 
omissions, can be the basis for a perjury charge. Despite this, 
there appear to be no modern reported cases in which such a 
 
 77. See HOLMES, supra note 62; see Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Ever-
coat Co., 759 F.2d 10, 14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[C]onduct before the [USPTO] which 
may render a patent unenforceable is broader than the common law tort of 
fraud.”). 
 78. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); 
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933). 
 79. See Gideon Mark & T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable Conduct and Walker 
Process Claims after Therasense and the America Invents Act, 16 U. PENN. J. 
BUS. L. 361, 381–86 (2014). 
 80. Id. at 391. 
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charge has been prosecuted.81 But in a case from 1913, Patter-
son, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for 
perjury when the defendant lied in his patent application that 
he was the original inventor.82 And the last time the Supreme 
Court considered the inequitable conduct doctrine, in Precision 
Instrument, during the 1945 term, the Court remarked that the 
case’s patent history was “steeped in perjury and undisclosed 
knowledge of perjury.”83 
In Precision Instrument, the plaintiff knew that another in-
ventor, Larson, had intentionally misrepresented facts to the 
USPTO when applying for the patent-in-suit.84 Instead of reveal-
ing this, which would have led to invalidation of the patent, the 
plaintiff contracted with Larson to keep the plaintiff ’s 
knowledge of Larson’s “perjury” secret so long as Larson agreed 
to license other patents to the plaintiff, and vice versa.85 When 
Larson breached the licensing agreements, the plaintiff brought 
suit, but because the plaintiff had contributed to Larson’s per-
jury, his own patent infringement suit was barred on inequitable 
conduct grounds.86 
Although Precision Instrument is not a criminal case, it is 
revealing that the Supreme Court considered the false state-
ments in the case tantamount to perjury. The Court noted that 
not all cases of inequitable conduct are punishable as perjury—
implying that at least in some cases, the fraud could be so egre-
gious and provident to justify prosecution.87 Read in light of Pat-
terson’s previous ruling, Precision Instrument did not disturb the 
possibility that patent applicants may be convicted for perjury if 
they make false statements to the USPTO. 
Perjury requires (1) an oath, (2) before a competent tribunal, 
officer, or person, (3) a statement that the declarant does not be-
lieve to be true and intentionally makes, (4) which is material.88 
 
 81. Individuals have been charged for providing false evidence and state-
ments to a court in a civil case involving patent validity. See, e.g., United States 
v. Mohsen, 587 F.3d 1028, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction and 
jury instructions). 
 82. See Patterson v. United States, 202 F. 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1913). 
 83. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816. 
 84. Id. at 809–13. 
 85. Id. at 813–14. 
 86. Id. at 816–20. 
 87. See id. at 815; see also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 
F.3d 1276, 1297–98 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (explaining that inequitable conduct must be flexible, as a doc-
trine that arose under the court’s equity powers). 
 88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2012); 60A AM. JUR. 2D PERJURY § 10 (2016). 
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Perjury also includes any declaration or statement under pen-
alty of perjury (when the statement is signed and accompanied 
by language indicating it is made under penalty of perjury),89 
along with previous elements (3) and (4).90 
Elements one and two would appear to be easily met if an 
applicant makes a false statement in a patent application and 
makes an oath, before a competent person, that certain aspects 
of the application are true.91 This was the basis for the perjury 
conviction in Patterson—the defendant had made the oath before 
a notary public. Applicants no longer need to make oaths of in-
ventorship before competent persons when submitting their ap-
plications, however, and may subscribe to the required applica-
tion documents in a declaration.92 To wit, the USPTO’s standard 
forms do not reference the perjury statute or the customary “un-
der penalty of perjury” language, but rather the false statements 
statute (discussed herein).93 Thus, perjury may not be viable in 
most circumstances.94 
But misrepresentations made before the USPTO’s Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board (the “PTAB”), a tribunal established by 
statute and composed of administrative judges95 who constitute 
officers or persons competent to give an oath under federal law,96 
could support a perjury charge. Proceedings before the PTAB, 
however, only occur in cases of reconsideration, reexaminations, 
interferences, or inter partes review.97 These proceedings are 
much less frequent than examinations.98 And, as already noted, 
 
 89. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2012). 
 90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2). 
 91. See Patterson, 202 F. at 210. 
 92. See 35 U.S.C. § 115; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.63, 21.68 (2015). 
 93. See Oaths and Declarations, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/pac/mpep/s602.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 94. The crime of false statement, which is related, may be, though. See infra 
Part II.B. 
 95. Id. 
 96. A competent tribunal, officer, or person is someone authorized to ad-
minister oaths. See United States v. Curtis, 107 U.S. 671, 673 (1883). Adminis-
trative law judges generally have such authority. See 21 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. 
§ 50:239 (2016); see also, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 23; 37 C.F.R. § 351.9(b)(1) (2006); 29 
C.F.R. § 1614.109(f )(2) (2012). 
 97. See About PTAB, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application 
-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/resources/about-ptab (last visited Apr. 
2, 2018). 
 98. By way of example, in the Woo-suk case, affidavits were submitted in 
support of the patent after it was initially rejected. Pollack, supra note 7. The 
affidavits then convinced the USPTO to change its mind. Id. 
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application materials are usually submitted for examination 
without an accompanying oath before a competent tribunal.99 
The ability to prove element three (the statement-intent el-
ement) in a case of inequitable conduct will, of course, depend 
upon the facts of the case. An outright material misrepresenta-
tion is certainly sufficient.100 But there are complications in 
other situations. Culpable statements must pertain to facts, not 
opinions or beliefs.101 Therefore, only statements concerning fac-
tual matters can be perjurious, such as statements relating to 
the non-existence of prior art, whether persons of ordinary skill 
in the art actually believe the invention to require sufficient skill 
and ingenuity, the utility of the proffered invention, or the 
named inventors—to name a few. This would probably not in-
clude an inventor or attorney’s legal arguments as to patentabil-
ity. Further, literally true, but vague or misleading, statements 
are insufficient grounds for perjury.102 This is a significant bar-
rier to prosecuting inequitable conduct as perjury because most 
patents involve highly-technical statements, which are likely to 
enable literal truth defenses. 
Most importantly, an intentional omission cannot qualify as 
perjury because, by definition, an omission is an absence of a 
statement, which the statute requires.103 Thus, failure to dis-
close prior art, for example, would not be punishable under the 
perjury statute unless the applicant falsely stated under oath 
that no prior art exists.104 Perjury may result if a person inten-
tionally makes a statement about a fact without knowing 
whether the statement is true or false.105 But the USPTO does 
 
 99. See 35 U.S.C. § 25 (2012); Oaths and Declarations, USPTO, http:// 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s602.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 100. This was the situation in Precision Instrument. See supra note 83 and 
accompanying text. 
 101. See 60A AM. JUR. 2D PERJURY § 18 (2016). 
 102. See, e.g., Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 361–62 (1973). 
 103. See id. at 362 (“[A]ny special problems arising from the literally true 
but unresponsive answer are to be remedied through the ‘questioner ’s acuity’ 
and not by a federal perjury prosecution.”); see also United States v. Martinez-
Mercado, 888 F.2d 1484, 1492 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The omission of certain facts 
from the reports and written statements of the prosecution’s witnesses, alone, 
is certainly not adequate to put the prosecution on notice of perjury on their 
part, much less to establish that such perjury in fact occurred.”). 
 104. Cf. THK Am., Inc. v. NSK, Ltd., 917 F. Supp. 563, 570 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(considering, in the context of Fed. R. Evid. 609(b), whether a prior conviction 
for filing false corporate income tax statements is sufficiently probative of 
whether an applicant committed the “crime” of withholding information from 
the USPTO). 
 105. See 60A AM. JUR. 2D PERJURY § 23 (2016). 
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not, as a matter of course, specifically ask whether there is prior 
art concerning an invention (let alone any other aspect of patent-
ability); instead, applicants and attorneys are obligated to reveal 
prior art and other information material to patentability under 
Rule 56.106 It is worth noting that before the Patent Act of 1952, 
however, applicants used to be required to attest that they “do[] 
not know and do[] not believe that the same [invention] was ever 
before known or used.”107 
The last element, materiality, is tested according to 
“whether the false statement was capable of influencing or mis-
leading a tribunal on any proper matter of inquiry . . . . [e]ven if 
the false statement failed to influence the tribunal.”108 In the pa-
tent context, this would include anything related to novelty, non-
obviousness, utility, inventorship, etc. For example, Woo-suk 
submitted an affidavit to the PTAB attesting to the utility of his 
stem cell cloning method patent, which led the USPTO to reverse 
an earlier decision denying the patent application.109 Surpris-
ingly, the inequitable conduct doctrine under Therasense applies 
a stricter materiality standard than perjury—by requiring but-
for causality. The perjury materiality standard is more encom-
passing because it renders illegal that conduct which could, but 
might not, have led the USPTO to grant a patent. Therefore, the 
crime of perjury might apply more often than the defense of in-
equitable misconduct. Given the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt evi-
dentiary burden in criminal cases, though, perjury—along with 
all other crimes discussed in this Part—is still harder to prove. 
But perhaps not by much; inequitable conduct must be shown by 
clear and convincing evidence, a burden of proof between pre-
ponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt.110 
B. FALSE STATEMENTS 
The crime of making false statements is similar to that of 
perjury, but creates culpability for false statements made to an 
 
 106. The USPTO may ask for “yes or no” responses to other questions, how-
ever, such as whether an applicant for a patent is the original and first inventor 
of the invention. See Patterson v. United States, 181 F. 970 (9th Cir. 1910). 
 107. Compare Patent Act of 1952 § 115, Pl. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (July 19, 1952) 
and 35 U.S.C. § 115(b), with Revised Statutes § 4892, 32 Stat. 1226, c. 1019 
(U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1454) (quoted) (as reported in Patterson v. United 
States, 202 F. 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1913)). 
 108. United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1155 (11th Cir. 2002) (empha-
sis added). 
 109. Pollack, supra note 7. 
 110. See infra Part III. 
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agency of the United States, such as the USPTO.111 Congress 
specifically provided that written, willful false statements made 
in a patent applications may be prosecuted as false statements 
in some situations.112 In addition to the to-an-agency jurisdic-
tional hook, the elements are: (1) knowingly and willfully, (2) fal-
sifying, concealing, or covering up by any trick, scheme, or device 
a fact; or making any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation; or making or using any false writing or docu-
ment containing any false fictitious or fraudulent statement or 
entry, (3) which is material.113 
There are at least two criminal cases on record that involve 
prosecution for a false statement made in a patent application. 
First, in Markham, the defendant made multiple false state-
ments, in an application and affidavits, to the USPTO about the 
identity of the original inventors of an invention.114 The defend-
ant made the statements in an effort to prevent the true inventor 
from seeking a similar patent. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction. In the same vein, in Camick, the defend-
ant, in emails to the USPTO and a patent application, repre-
sented that his brother was the original inventor.115 However, 
the defendant’s brother died as a child, and the defendant had 
assumed the brother’s identity in an effort to evade several obli-
gations. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the convic-
tion for lack of materiality (discussed below). These two cases 
demonstrate that a false statement charge for inequitable con-
duct is not unprecedented. Both cases (in addition to the Patter-
son perjury case), however, concern only false statements relat-
ing to the identity of inventors, not other patentability 
requirements or bars. 
Just as in cases of perjury, literally true statements, opin-
ions, and beliefs are not actionable false statements.116 But un-
like perjury, omissions can constitute the making of a false state-
ment, so long as the omission involves affirmative 
 
 111. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012). 
 112. See 35 U.S.C. § 25(b). Given the dearth of prosecutions, though, this 
congressional suggestion appears to have been largely overlooked. 
 113. Id. at (a)(1)–(3). 
 114. See United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 115. See United States v. Camick, 796 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 116. See, e.g., United States v. Hixon, 987 F.2d 1261, 1267 (6th Cir. 1993). 
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concealment.117 This can be shown when there is a duty to dis-
close material facts.118 In patent cases, USPTO Rule 56 clearly 
evinces a duty to disclose information material to patentability. 
Thus, a willful failure to disclose prior art, for example, would 
constitute a prosecutable false statement.119 
The false statement statute also requires materiality gener-
ally, similar to the perjury standard and less than the The-
rasense standard. Materiality is shown when a statement has “a 
natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the 
decision of the decision making body to which it was ad-
dressed.”120 In inequitable conduct cases, then, any statement 
regarding patentability—as well as, for example, the true iden-
tity of the inventor(s)—is material.121 Both Markham and 
Camick confirm this understanding, even though the conviction 
in Camick was reversed for lack of materiality. The situation in 
Camick was somewhat unique; the defendant had chosen to file 
a provisional patent application,122 which does not require an 
oath of inventorship and is not examined, instead of a nonprovi-
sional application (the full application).123 The provisional appli-
cation was not capable of influencing a USPTO action because 
the USPTO does not make any decision with respect to provi-
sional applications.124 
 
 117. See United States v. London, 550 F.2d 206, 213–14 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(“[T]he mere omission of failing truthfully to disclose a material fact . . . does 
not make out an offense under the conceal or cover up clause. . . . Rather, the 
. . . clause . . . requires the government to prove . . . that the material fact was 
affirmatively concealed . . . .”). 
 118. See, e.g., United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1312 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 119. One judge has also criticized a knowing failure to correct the USPTO’s 
misunderstanding about prior art as “sleazy.” Dorothy Atkins, Attys Who Don’t 
Correct Patent Examiners “Sleazy”: Judge, LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2017), https:// 
www.law360.com/ip/articles/969132/attys-who-don-t-correct-patent-examiners 
-sleazy-judge. 
 120. See United States v. Schulte, 741 F.3d 1141, 1154 (10th Cir. 2014) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. A false oath of inventorship would always be material under both the 
false statement standard and Therasense standard, despite their differences, 
because “the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit” is always material under 
Therasense. 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 122. See Provisional Application for Patent, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/provisional 
-application-patent (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
 123. See United States v. Camick, 796 F.3d 1206, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 124. Id. 
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Finally, the intent element (knowingly and willfully) may on 
its face impose a limitation on the ability to successfully prose-
cute a false statement when an applicant omits information. For 
example, it may be difficult to prove knowing and willful conceal-
ment in the case of willful blindness. If the defendant is not 
knowledgeable of prior art, then failure to disclose any prior art 
would not be a knowing nondisclosure. But intent might be 
shown where the applicant exhibited a reckless disregard for the 
truth, combined with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the 
truth.125 The inequitable conduct defense captures similar will-
ful blindness.126 Such an allowance ensures that the willfully ig-
norant cannot evade the consequences of their deliberate inac-
tions. 
C. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 
Inequitable conduct may constitute obstruction of justice, 
which has a broad reach and is set forth in several statutes. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has noted that the fraudulent procure-
ment of a patent constitutes “tampering with the administration 
of justice . . . [that] involves more than an injury to a single liti-
gant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and 
safeguard the public.”127 The crime of obstruction of justice is 
purposed on addressing harm to broader public interests and in-
stitutions, such as the harm risked and caused by inequitable 
conduct.  
The most applicable statutory variant lies in 18 U.S.C. 
§1505, which makes it a crime to (1) corruptly endeavor to influ-
ence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of 
the law, (2) under which any pending proceeding is being had 
before any federal agency.128 The first element is met by conduct 
that involves intentionally (and with an improper purpose) al-
tering, destroying, or concealing evidence or making a false or 
 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 70–72 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 126. See, e.g., Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 
1347, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 
267 F.3d 1370, 1380–86 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Synthon IP, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 472 F. 
Supp. 2d 760, 779–80 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff ’d in part, 281 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (unpublished opinion) (“[T]he duty of candor cannot be avoided by willful 
ignorance or compartmentalization of knowledge within a company in an effort 
to insulate the patent applicants and their attorneys from information unfavor-
able to patentability. So, too, patent applicants cannot avoid the duty of candor 
by failing to disclose material information to their lawyer or the prosecuting 
attorney.”). 
 127. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944). 
 128. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2004). 
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misleading statement.129 Similar standards relating to perjury 
and false statements apply, but materiality is not required.130 
This makes obstruction of justice easier to prosecute.131 
The second element presents difficulties in the inequitable 
conduct context. It requires obstruction of a pending proceeding 
conducted by any federal agency, such as the USPTO. “Proceed-
ings” is a broad term which includes agency investigations, ad-
judications, and essentially any judicial or administrative busi-
ness before the agency.132 PTAB reexaminations, appeals, 
interferences, and reviews would likely count as proceedings un-
der this definition because they are formal, quasi-judicial pro-
cesses. But what of examinations, or reconsiderations, where 
most inequitable conduct (by definition) occurs? These processes 
are not seemingly judicial in nature, but they technically involve 
“adjudications” (or decisions) under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.133 Thus, any qualifying obstruction relating to the 
proper application of patent law to a patent application may be 
considered obstruction of justice. 
For example, intentionally failing to disclose prior art, or in-
tentionally misleading the USPTO to believe that a claimed in-
vention has actual and realizable utility, would certainly impede 
the due and proper administration of the law if a patent is issued 
as a result of such concealment—as would intentionally failing 
to give credit to the true inventor(s), as in Patterson and Mark-
ham. Given that materiality is not required, the barrier in 
Camick would not exist in prosecutions for obstruction of justice. 
Despite this, there do not appear to be any reported cases prose-
cuting inequitable conduct as obstruction of justice. 
D. MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD 
The mail and wire fraud statutes are extremely broad, 
granting prosecutors the ability to employ the offense to address 
 
 129. See William E. Aiken, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of 
18 U.S.C. § 1505 Making it a Federal Offense to Obstruct Proceedings Before 
Federal Departments or Agencies or Congressional Committees, 8 A.L.R. Fed. 
893, §§ 1–7 (2016). 
 130. See id.; see also United States v. Price, 951 F.2d 1028, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 
1991) (listing the elements of the crime and not including any element of mate-
riality). Note also that the obstruction need not be successful in any way. See 
United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277, 1278 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 
 131. In fact, it is not even necessary that the conduct involved be illegal on 
its own. See Aiken, Jr., supra note 129, at § 4.5. 
 132. See, e.g., Rice vs. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1966). 
 133. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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fraud in many of its forms.134 The Supreme Court has remarked 
that both statutes perform a “stopgap” function, enabling the 
federal government to address “new phenomenon, until particu-
larized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly 
with the evil.”135 With this in mind, it would seem apt to turn to 
the mail and wire fraud statutes to prosecute inequitable con-
duct. Yet, there only appears to be one case on record that does: 
Camick. 
Generally speaking, mail or wire fraud require proof of the 
following: (1) the defendant devised or intended to devise a 
scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain property by means of ma-
terially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or prom-
ises, (2) with an intent to defraud, and (3) used or caused to be 
used the mail or interstate wire communications to carry out the 
scheme.136 The materiality aspect of the first element tracks the 
same standard used in both perjury and false statements and is 
more lenient than the standard required to commit inequitable 
conduct under Therasense.137 Recall that in Camick the false 
statement was the identity of the inventor listed in a provisional 
patent application, so the false statement was not material and 
could not have a tendency to influence the USPTO.138 
It might appear at first glance that mail or wire fraud is 
readily chargeable in cases of inequitable conduct, but the first 
element presents an unexpected barrier. Both the mail and wire 
fraud statutes require a “scheme or artifice to defraud, or for ob-
taining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises.”139 The utility of this pas-
sage depends on how “defraud” is defined and the effect of the 
second “or,” which separates the “scheme to defraud” language 
from “obtaining money or property through false statements.” 
 
 134. JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 
145 (3d ed. 2009). 
 135. Id. (citing United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974)). 
 136. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2012); see also United States v. Camick, 
796 F.3d 1206, 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 137. See Camick, 796 F.3d at 1218. Note that the materiality requirement is 
not listed in the statute, but that the Supreme Court ruled that Congress in-
tended to include it by codifying the common law. Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 20–25 (1999). Also note that the dissent in Therasense pointed out the 
higher standard of materiality required in equitable conduct cases, as opposed 
to under the mail and wire fraud statutes. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson 
& Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, Gajarsa, Dyk, & Prost, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 138. Camick, 796 F.3d at 1218–19. 
 139. 18 U.S.C §§ 1341, 1343 (emphasis added). 
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The interpretation of these two words in the statute has great 
limiting effect, as evidenced by the Federal Circuit’s Semicon-
ductor Energy opinion.140 
In Semiconductor Energy, the defendant asserted civil RICO 
counterclaims in response to the plaintiff ’s claim of patent in-
fringement.141 The RICO suit was based on predicate acts of mail 
and wire fraud, in that the plaintiff had defrauded the USPTO 
by failing to disclose prior art when the plaintiff applied for three 
of the patents-in-suit.142 In evaluating the mail and wire fraud 
acts, the Federal Circuit held that inequitable conduct does not 
qualify as an act of mail or wire fraud because the statutes nar-
rowly define fraud as depriving another person of property.143 
The Federal Circuit then stated that although a patent is prop-
erty, the USPTO itself was not deprived of the patent-in-suit be-
cause the USPTO did not have property rights in the patent be-
fore it granted the patent.144 
In making these determinations, the Federal Circuit relied 
primarily on the Supreme Court’s McNally decision, which lim-
ited both the mail and wire fraud statutes’ breadth to exclude 
intangible property rights, such as the right to honest services, 
on legislative intent grounds.145 The dissent in McNally argued, 
however, that the majority was ignoring Congress’s use of the 
word “or” between the “scheme to defraud” and “property rights” 
language.146 In the dissenters’ view, “[a]s the language makes 
clear . . . one could violate the first clause by devising a scheme 
or artifice to defraud, even though one did not violate the second 
clause by seeking to obtain money or property.”147 
Several circuit courts agreed. For example, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed a mail fraud conviction for the fraud-
ulent acquisition of a medical license, stating “[t]he statute . . . 
 
 140. See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 204 F.3d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 141. Id. at 1372. 
 142. Id. at 1379. 
 143. Id. at 1380. 
 144. See id. 
 145. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987), superseded by stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (1988), as recognized in Skilling v. United States, 561 
U.S. 358 (2010). 
 146. Id. at 364–65 (Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 365 (“I am at a loss to understand the source or justification for 
this holding. Certainly no canon of statutory construction requires us to ignore 
the plain language of the provision.”). 
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is broad enough to cover a scheme to defraud a victim of some-
thing that takes on value only in the hands of the acquirer.”148 
Relying on McNally, though, the Supreme Court in Cleveland 
reversed the Third and other Circuits, stating that property ac-
quired through fraud must first be property in the regulator’s 
hands.149 The Supreme Court repeated its ultimatum from 
McNally that “if Congress desires to go further, it must speak 
more clearly than it has.”150 This holding did not rely on an in-
terpretation of the statute’s disjunctive language. Ten years af-
ter Semiconductor Energy, the Supreme Court recognized in 
Skilling that Congress overruled McNally.151 However, Skilling 
only narrowly expanded property rights to include deprivation of 
honest services resulting from bribes and kickbacks, in line with 
Cleveland.152 
In light of the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the 
mail and wire fraud statutes, it is unlikely that inequitable con-
duct falls within their ambit. However, it is worth noting that 
some courts have taken notice of the disjunctive “or” and defined 
schemes to defraud as including departures from standards of 
fair play and candid dealings.153 Such schemes would include 
concealment of facts through intentional omissions or failures to 
disclose in violation of either a legal or ethical duty.154 Thus, the 
first element would be met even in cases where an applicant in-
tentionally fails to disclose prior art under USPTO Rule 56. 
The other two elements would likely be met in most cases of 
inequitable conduct. Intent can be shown by the circum-
stances,155 and all interactions with the USPTO—with the ex-
ception of in-person hearings in front of the PTAB—are con-
ducted via mail or interstate wires.156 Absent congressional 
 
 148. United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 709, 713 (3d Cir. 1990), abrogated 
by Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000). 
 149. See Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 20. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–10 (2010). 
 152. Id. at 409. 
 153. See Marissa Pezo, Mail and Wire Fraud, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 745, 749 
(2007). 
 154. See id. at 752 & n.54 (citing United States v. Richman, 944 F.2d 323, 
333 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 155. See Pezo, supra note 153, at 752. 
 156. The use of the mail or wires would also be in furtherance of the 
scheme—or at the very least incidental to an essential part of it—as a direct 
misrepresentation or omission affecting the issuance of a patent. See id. at 756–
57. 
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expansion of the mail and wire fraud statutes, however, fraudu-
lent procurement of a patent is not a violation under the Cleve-
land and Semiconductor Energy precedents despite prior circuit 
enthusiasm to hold otherwise. This is one specific area in which 
the mail and wire fraud statutes are not quite as broad as popu-
larly believed.157 
III.  WHETHER PROSECUTING INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
IS WARRANTED   
Cases such as Patterson, Markham, and Camick demon-
strate that prosecuting inequitable conduct is possible under the 
perjury and false statement statutes, and it is very likely that 
obstruction of justice is also viable. But such prosecutions are 
rare. This Part asks whether, even if prosecution is possible, the 
federal government should bring charges in certain circum-
stances. 
A. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There are two main schools of thought with respect to crim-
inal punishment: utilitarianism and retributivism.158 Utilitari-
anism aims primarily to deter and prevent crimes and considers 
the myriad of factors that motivate human behavior.159 On the 
retributivism side, punishment is seen as correcting an imbal-
ance of justice or blameworthiness perceived by a collective con-
science.160 This view takes into account the costs and harms im-
posed by certain conduct and the unfair power disadvantage that 
perpetrators have over their victims.161 It seeks to right wrongs 
against others, sometimes no matter the externalities. 
 
 157. There are several good reasons to think that the mail and wire fraud 
statutes should encompass inequitable conduct. See Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari, Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (No. 00-138), 2000 WL 33999400. 
 158. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 757–58 (2007). A third, newer school of 
thought, “over-criminalization,” challenges, among other things, the use of crim-
inal law to regulate conduct that traditionally only engendered civil conse-
quences. See, e.g., Michael P. Kelly & Ruth E. Mandelbaum, Are the Yates Mem-
orandum and the Federal Judiciary’s Concerns About Over-Criminaliziation 
Destined to Collide?, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899 (2016); Stephen F. Smith, Over-
coming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537 (2012). 
 159. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural 
Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH. L. REV. 205, 208–16 (2003). 
 160. See id. at 216–24. 
 161. See id. 
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Both utilitarianism and retributivism support criminal 
prosecution of inequitable conduct in cases where such conduct 
can be shown beyond-a-reasonable-doubt and would not raise 
the concerns that informed Therasense’s heightened standards. 
Starting with retributivism, punishing those who intentionally 
procure patents via inequitable conduct and later abuse the pa-
tent monopoly comports with the goals of correcting wrongs: not 
only those committed in fraudulently procuring a patent, but 
also in fraudulently litigating it. This is especially the case when 
there is a large power differential between a patent holder and 
an accused infringer—a not uncommon occurrence.162 Thus, 
there is a need for the government to actively protect down-
stream victims of inequitable conduct (especially small ones), as 
well as to send a clear message that inequitable conduct is ille-
gal.163 In addition, inequitable conduct “is a wrong against the 
institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institu-
tions in which fraud cannot be complacently tolerated.”164 Pros-
ecuting inequitable conduct would not only vindicate private 
wrongs, but also public wrongs as well. 
As to utilitarianism, just like criminal fraud generally, ineq-
uitable conduct (and conduct incidental to it) involves deceit, 
which society generally has an interest in deterring and prevent-
ing. Society also has a utilitarian interest in deterring and pre-
venting patent fraud in particular, due to its resulting effects. 
Not only does the assertion of fraudulently-procured patents 
against businesses and consumers impose unwarranted and 
enormous costs on the American economy, but also actually prov-
ing inequitable conduct in a court of law may require upwards of 
$10 million in attorneys’ fees, depending on the circum-
stances.165 Moreover, the power of a patent’s monopoly grant, es-
pecially when wielded in a way that leads to increased costs to 
the public and possible anticompetitive effects, is substantial.166 
Prosecution may serve as a way of deterring inequitable conduct 
 
 162. See Chien, supra note 38, at 1592. 
 163. See Retributive Justice, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(June 18, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-retributive/#Pun. 
 164. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944). 
 165. See TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1309 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming an award of over $10 million in attorneys’ fees for 
defending against a sham infringement suit and bringing an antitrust action); 
TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 16 F. Supp. 3d 385, 398 (D. N.J. 
2014). 
 166. See, e.g., Kyle R. Kroll, Anticompetitive Until Proven Innocent: An Anti-
trust Proposal to Embargo Covert Patent Privateering, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2167, 
2189–95 (2016). 
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and preventing its attendant harms and, therefore, would be jus-
tified under utilitarianism. 
Most judges and scholars tend to evaluate white-collar pun-
ishment from the lens of utilitarianism and focus especially on 
deterrence.167 Because most white-collar criminals typically 
have short or non-existent criminal records (or are not even per-
sons, such as when corporations themselves are defendants), the 
goal is to punish with an eye toward what will most likely influ-
ence defendants’ future behavior, other similarly-situated pro-
fessionals, and the industry’s culture.168 With this in mind, there 
is an instinctual tendency to punish crimes harshly as a warning 
that the law will come down hard. However, research suggests 
that the certainty of punishment deters much more than the se-
verity of punishment.169 This is especially the case for low-risk 
(of violent harm) offenders such as white-collar criminals.170 
Thus, courts are faced with the difficult task of both conveying 
the message that punishment for certain conduct is very likely, 
while at the same time imposing adequate—but not too lenient—
punishments to deter would-be offenders from committing the 
crimes sought to be deterred.171 This invariably requires taking 
into account the possible rewards derived from the criminal con-
duct, as well as the risk of social stigma and peers’ moral con-
demnation.172 
 
 167. See Kenneth Mann et al., Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 17 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 479, 482–83 (1980), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=5129&context=fss_papers. 
 168. See id. at 483. 
 169. See, e.g., Valerie Wright, Deterence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Cer-
tainty vs. Severity of Punishment, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 3 (2010), http:// 
www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in 
-Criminal-Justice.pdf. 
 170. See id. at 7; see also Five Things About Deterrence, NAT. INST. OF JUS-
TICE, https://www.nij.gov/five-things/Pages/deterrence.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 
2018) (“Sending an individual convicted of a crime to prison isn’t a very effective 
way to deter crime.”). 
 171. See Katie A. Fredericks et al., White Collar Crime: Recidivism, Deter-
rence, and Social Impact, 2 FORENSIC RES. & CRIMINOLOGY INT’L J. 39, 39 
(2016), http://medcraveonline.com/FRCIJ/FRCIJ-02-00039.pdf. 
 172. See RAY PATERNOSTER & STEPHEN G. TIBBETTS, THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND PERCEPTUAL DE-
TERRENCE (2016), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/ 
9780199925513.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199925513-e-30; J. Scott Dutcher, 
Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications for Harsher 
Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1295, 1319 
(2006). 
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In the patent fraud context, courts also have to consider how 
to deter both individuals and organizations because either can 
commit inequitable conduct. All the crimes discussed in this ar-
ticle provide for, in addition to individual liability, corporate lia-
bility for the acts of agents under theories of respondeat supe-
rior.173 Inventors within a corporation, as well as the corporation 
itself, can be prosecuted for inequitable conduct.174 For this rea-
son, employers should have programs and policies to ensure that 
their employee-applicants comply with Rule 56.  
Principal liability statutes also capture any persons who 
“counsel” the commission of an offense, such as attorneys.175 In 
addition to bringing a charge against an inventor and/or a cor-
porate-employer, a charge against an attorney is possible.176 Be-
cause attorneys are in a position to prevent inequitable conduct 
by advising clients on patentability requirements, bars, and the 
duty of candor,177 the possibility of prosecution for assisting 
fraud may serve as an additional deterrent overall.178 But 
 
 173. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (for antitrust violations). 
 174. Successful prosecution against a corporation may be possible because 
patents are for the benefit of the employer; the corporate-employer almost al-
ways holds all patent rights as “assignee.” See Ownership/Assignability of Pa-
tents and Applications, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/ 
s301.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). In addition, being listed as the assignee 
requires a record of assignment in the application. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.46 (2012). 
This could exhibit the principal’s approval of the inventor-employee’s conduct. 
Though, whether specific instances of nondisclosure or misrepresentation were 
approved of by the employer would remain a question of fact. 
 175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); see also United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313 (2d 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1986) (involving 
§ 1001). In most cases, attorneys assist inventors (whether persons or corpora-
tions) in applying for a patent. 
 176. This implicates issues relating to confidentiality and attorney-client 
privilege. For example, would an attorney be allowed to share information about 
any fraud in applying for the patent because the ethics rules might allow for 
disclosure? See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2012). Would the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege apply? See 
Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding 
that the exception applies to fraud on the patent office). Attorneys operating in 
the intellectual property space face a host of challenging ethical issues that may 
implicate inequitable conduct. See generally Leonard Raykinsteen, Ethical Con-
siderations in Intellectual Property Law, 99 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
47, 59 (2017). 
 177. See Patent Litigation Practice Note, supra note 40 (stating that patent 
trolls, for example, often regularly use the same counsel). 
 178. But see Van Asdale v. Int’l Game, Tech., 498 F.Supp.2d 1321 (D. Nev. 
2007), rev’d and vacated, 577 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that attorneys 
did not receive whistleblower protection for disclosing fraud on the USPTO un-
der the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
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whether the possible punishments under the most applicable 
statutes would be great enough to deter inequitable conduct by 
offsetting its advantages and rewards depends on the facts, cir-
cumstances, and motivations behind each patent.  
A conviction for inequitable conduct via perjury, false state-
ment, or obstruction of justice could entail fines and/or prison 
sentences of up to five years.179 These consequences—as op-
posed, or in addition, to professional discipline or the invalida-
tion of a patent—might be enough to deter unscrupulous appli-
cants from defrauding the USPTO, offsetting the ill-gotten gains 
to be realized through litigating the patents and obtaining set-
tlement awards. When it comes to corporations and other enti-
ties, however, small fines might not deter.180 Liability of corpo-
rate officers and suspension from asserting patent infringement 
or even applying for new patents would likely be sufficient. This 
punishment was handed down in a civil case brought by the De-
partment of Justice for inequitable conduct in Union Camp.181 
Combined with the professional and business stigma that would 
likely result from being branded a patent fraudster, these pun-
ishments could offset the potential benefits derived from inequi-
table conduct. Criminal punishment would likely have a 
stronger effect than usual in deterring behavior here because pa-
tent applicants are typically knowledgeable about the state of 
the law and can easily understand the consequences of violating 
it—two important factors to effective deterrence.182 
That inequitable conduct continues to occur suggests that 
current consequences, like that of the defense of inequitable con-
 
 179. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1001(a), 1505 (2012). 
 180. Some litigants can fetch average settlements of around $300,000. See 
Patent Assertion Entity Activity, FTC, 3, 10, 43 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-study/ 
p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf; Mario H. Lopez, 
Patent Trolls Profit at Your Expense, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 11, 2014), http:// 
www.washingtonexaminer.com/patent-trolls-profit-at-your-expense/article/ 
2541977; Ira Blumberg, Why Patent Trolls Won’t Give Up, TECH CRUNCH (June 
5, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/05/why-patent-trolls-wont-give-up. 
 181. See United States v. Union Camp Corp., No. 5005-A, 1969 WL 192827 
(E.D. Va. 1969). 
 182. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A 
Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 173, 173, 175 
(2004). 
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duct and professional discipline, fail to fully deter fraud from oc-
curring.183 Indeed, one commentator has reasoned that the ineq-
uitable conduct defense and punishment of invalidation create 
“upside-down incentives to engage in dishonest conduct,” result-
ing in little to no deterrence at all.184 Some might argue that in-
equitable conduct is not so widespread as to justify deterrence 
using the criminal law.185 But given application trends, the op-
portunities to procure patents through fraud, the USPTO’s lack 
of resources, the difficulty in investigating and stopping inequi-
table conduct during the application process, the harmful effects 
that can result from inequitable conduct down the line, that 
many patent cases never proceed past early stages and are set-
tled due to the high cost to defend, and that courts continue to 
find inequitable conduct, the problem is at least serious enough 
to warrant such consequences in the worst cases. Even if inequi-
table conduct is not widespread, prosecuting the most egregious 
cases of inequitable conduct is worthwhile and desirable because 
doing so fulfills the goals of criminal punishment and would 
work to deter more egregious cases in the future. Focusing on 
the worst cases would also comport with Therasense. 
B. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In order to realize the benefits of prosecution, the Depart-
ment of Justice would need to actually charge applicants for com-
mitting inequitable conduct. Traditionally, the Department con-
siders three factors when charging: (1) whether there is a 
substantial federal interest, (2) whether the proposed defendant 
is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, and (3) 
whether there is an adequate non-criminal alternative to prose-
cution.186 Due to the increased interest in and scrutiny of pa-
tents, the overwhelming public interests at stake,187 and the sig-
nificant interests in maintaining the health of a system that is 
 
 183. E.g., Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). 
 184. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense, 107 
NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2013); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 
F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[I]t seems most improbable that an inventor 
would choose to forfeit the benefits of patent protection because of fear of the 
risk of being found tortiously liable based upon attempting to enforce a patent 
obtained by inequitable conduct.”). 
 185. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major 
patent case has become an absolute plague.”). 
 186. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.220 (2015). 
 187. See,e.g., Leslie, supra note 41, at 325. 
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responsible for the United States’ continued technological might, 
inequitable conduct is a matter of substantial federal interest.188 
Indeed, one of the Department’s top priorities is fighting fraud 
in the business world and related misconduct.189 
Applicants who commit inequitable conduct are not subject 
to effective prosecution in other jurisdictions. Most states have 
recently enacted statutes criminalizing the assertion of patent 
infringement in bad faith.190 These state criminal statutes target 
activities that sometimes are derivative of and incidental to 
fraud during the application process. But these laws do not ad-
dress the root cause (for some cases) of bad faith litigation: 
namely, that a patent is granted when it should not have been 
and through fraud. This result is exacerbated by the statutory 
presumption that a patent is valid,191 which can deter rivals 
from competing in an industry and enable fraudulent patent 
holders to extort large settlements and achieve anticompetitive 
ends.192 
In addition, current non-criminal alternatives do not appear 
sufficient to deter inequitable conduct. Despite the existence of 
the defense of inequitable conduct, affirmative defenses of patent 
invalidity, and professional discipline,193 inequitable conduct 
persists and may even be increasing in frequency.194 Therefore, 
there may be reason to believe that non-criminal alternatives are 
inadequate, which may also justify finding a substantial federal 
interest in deterring inequitable conduct.195 This would come 
 
 188. This might be especially the case in certain districts where patent liti-
gation consumes the docket. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Pa-
tent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 
11 JOHN MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 28 (2011). Note, however, that the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group 
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017), may change which districts the effects of 
patent fraud will be felt the most in the future.  
 189. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL: 
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE WRONGDOING (2015), https:// 
www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter Yates Memo]. 
 190. See Hyde, supra note 22. 
 191. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
 192. See, e.g., Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Is-
sues, ANTITRUST, Summer 2013, at 10. 
 193. See 35 U.S.C. § 32; e.g., Jaskiewisz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987). 
 194. This is shown by the fact that the patentee win percentage in inequita-
ble conduct cases has been trending down for the past 30 years. See Lee Pether-
bridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical As-
sessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1310 (2010). 
 195. Cf. Candor, Disclsoure & OED, USPTO, 3 (2016), https://www.uspto 
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into play most when the inequitable conduct is highly deceptive 
and brazen. 
Ultimately, though, bringing a charge is always a matter of 
discretion. The fact that the Department of Justice has already 
prosecuted fraud on the USPTO in Patterson and Markham and 
brought charges in Camick shows that at least some U.S. Attor-
neys believe bringing false statement charges is warranted in 
appropriate cases. But whether the Department of Justice would 
charge a corporation in addition to its employees would depend 
on many factors, such as the pervasiveness of the conduct.196 
Where appropriate, charging a corporation may assist in secur-
ing its cooperation in investigating a pattern or practice of ineq-
uitable conduct.197 
Even if U.S. Attorneys do decide to prosecute inequitable 
conduct, there may be a concern that proving a violation of any 
of the criminal statutes discussed herein would be too difficult. 
In many cases, there is not enough evidence to prove inequitable 
conduct even under the clear and convincing evidence standard, 
and courts often reject assertions of inequitable conduct.198 Prov-
ing intent beyond a reasonable doubt may be very difficult be-
cause the circumstantial evidence in many cases of inequitable 
conduct, even though proven by clear and convincing evidence, 
may only show that an applicant did not do something. Circum-
stantial evidence showing willful or knowing behavior is not im-
 
.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AIPLA_2016_Slides.pdf (showing that only 
twenty-two persons registered to practice before the USPTO were disciplined in 
2016). 
 196. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 186, at § 9-28.300; see also id. at 
§ 9-28.1000 (noting that whether a corporation has taken meaningful remedial 
measures, implemented meaningful corporate compliance programs, estab-
lished awareness among employees that criminal conduct will not be tolerated, 
and exhibits “the highest standards of legal and ethical behavior” are factors to 
consider when determining whether or not to prosecute a corporation). 
 197. For example, the Yates Memo outlines how cooperation can serve as a 
mitigating factor. See Yates Memo, supra note 189. 
 198. See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1196–97 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) (referring to the assertion of inequitable conduct 
as often “specious” and widespread assertion as a “plague”); Petherbridge et al., 
supra note 194, at 1315–16. But see Ryan Davis, Inequitable Conduct a Dying 
Defense 2 Years Post-Therasense, LAW360 (May 23, 2013), https://www.law360 
.com/articles/444480/inequitable-conduct-a-dying-defense-2-years-post 
-therasense (reporting that practitioners have seen a marked decline in the as-
sertion of inequitable conduct after Therasense). 
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possible to come by, however. And systematic inequitable con-
duct might be enough to prove a deliberate scheme or practice to 
defraud the USPTO in some cases.199 
One recent inequitable conduct ruling illustrates that suffi-
cient evidence of inequitable conduct may exist in some cases. In 
TransWeb v. 3M, the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of ineq-
uitable conduct when 3M declared to the USPTO that 3M re-
ceived samples of its applied-for invention after signing a confi-
dentiality agreement.200 Based on this, 3M claimed the samples 
were not prior art. But in fact, 3M received the samples at an 
industry expo. The district court, after reviewing the extensive 
evidence in the case, concluded that “in-house attorney[s] at 3M 
. . . acted with specific intent to deceive the patent office as to the 
[samples].”201 The evidence supporting this conclusion included 
expo documents, emails, letters, testimony, meeting notes, and 
the actual samples.202 3M was also found liable for a Walker Pro-
cess violation.203 
Although TransWeb may be abnormal in its wealth of evi-
dence, similar cases also exist.204 The Department of Justice 
would be aided by discovery in civil cases and could pick and 
choose the most prosecutable cases of inequitable conduct based 
on civil rulings. A finding of inequitable conduct in a civil case 
could also constitute admissible evidence of a prior bad act.205 
Although concerns over the burden of proof are valid, they do not 
completely undercut the worthy goal of deterring inequitable 
conduct in the patent system.  
 
 199. See Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., 732 F.3d 1339, 1344–45 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
 200. See TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1304–
05 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 16 F. Supp. 3d 
385, 398 (D. N.J. 2014). 
 201. Transweb, 812 F.3d at 1304. 
 202. See id. at 1305–06. 
 203. See id. at 1309–10 (“3M’s unlawful act was the bringing of suit based 
on a patent known to be fraudulently obtained.”). The author makes no judg-
ment as to whether 3M committed inequitable conduct and merely cites 
Transweb as a recent ruling applicable to the subject of this Essay.  
 204. See,e.g., Intellect Wireless, 732 F.4d at 1344–45; Regeneron Pharma., 
Inc. v. Mercus B.V., 144 F.Supp.3d 530, 582–85, 595–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); World-
wide Home Prods., Inc. v. Bed, Bath and Beyond, Inc., 74 F.Supp.3d 626, 636–
38 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 205. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung 
Elec. Co., 4 F.Supp.2d 477, 487 (E.D. Vir. 1998). But see McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. 
Perrigo Co., 516 F.Supp.2d 238, 258 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Procter & Gamble Co. 
v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 697 F.Supp. 1360, 1366–67 (D. Del. 1988). 
 
2018] PROSECUTING INEQUITABLE BEHAVIOR 81 
 
C. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
As noted above in Part II, the statutory schemes for the most 
applicable federal crimes can present non-intuitive obstacles to 
prosecuting inequitable conduct. If there is legislative support, 
some minor statutory modifications would alleviate those obsta-
cles. One such change would be to revive the statutory require-
ment that an applicant’s oath (made upon submitting the appli-
cation and currently only relating to inventorship) include not 
only an affirmative declaration that there is no prior art, but also 
that the applicant has actual knowledge of the invention’s utility 
and level of required ingenuity and skill to make.206 Making this 
change would require applicants to make more affirmative state-
ments. The change would impose additional duties on appli-
cants, but those additional duties could assist the USPTO in its 
examination process. 
Another change would be to fix the disjunctive language in 
the mail and wire fraud statutes to allow prosecution merely for 
schemes to defraud. In the alternative, the language could be 
changed to enable prosecution for the obtaining of property that 
does not exist until issued by a government office and in the 
hands of the applicant (e.g., a medical license or a patent). Such 
a change would override Semiconductor Energy and Cleveland’s 
current obstacle for prosecuting inequitable conduct under the 
mail and wire fraud statutes.207 Fixing the disjunctive language 
or better defining property for mail and wire fraud would clarify 
the statutes and open the door to prosecuting patterned and 
large-scale schemes to defraud the USPTO. 
The above reforms would increase the possibility of prose-
cuting inequitable conduct. By increasing this possibility, deter-
rence would be heightened. The reforms would also enable courts 
to impose broader penalties, when needed, to effectuate the 
proper balance between the risks and rewards of committing in-
equitable conduct as part of a scheme. Finally, reforms could also 
provide better notice to applicants that certain conduct is crimi-
nal, reducing Rule of Lenity concerns.208 For example, a broader 
 
 206. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 134–60 and accompanying text. 
 208. To this end, the possibility that the Rule of Lenity, see 73 AM. JUR. 2D 
Statutes § 188 (2018), might be applied to a prosecution for inequitable conduct 
would be reduced, even though the possibility is low already. To wit, lenity was 
not brought up in Patterson, Markham, or Camick. 
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applicant oath would put applicants on greater notice that ma-
terial omissions could be prosecuted as perjury, false statements, 
or obstruction of justice.209 
  CONCLUSION   
Inequitable conduct is the act of intentionally making a ma-
terially false statement or omission to the USPTO when apply-
ing for a patent. This form of fraud is brought on by competitive 
or deceptive interests, enabled by imperfections in the U.S. pa-
tent system, and motivated by the ever-increasing value of pa-
tents. Once the fraud is successful and a patent is granted, un-
scrupulous applicants often turn into unscrupulous litigants and 
use their patents to extort settlements through threats and liti-
gation. Overall, inequitable conduct imposes costs on consumers, 
competition, and the economy. 
At least three criminal prosecutions have been brought 
against applicants for committing inequitable conduct. Two 
modern cases were for the crime of false statements, but inequi-
table conduct may also constitute the crimes of perjury and ob-
struction of justice against an agency. Mail and wire fraud are 
not applicable under current precedent. Although successful 
criminal prosecution of inequitable conduct is possible under the 
federal perjury, false statements, and obstruction of justice stat-
utes, it is up to the Department of Justice to pursue such charges 
when appropriate, in view of the goals of punishment and pros-
ecutorial guidelines. Given the federal interests at stake, prose-
cution is desirable in egregious cases. And the deterrent effect of 
such prosecutions would likely promote greater applicant ac-




 209. See Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1217, 1284 n.145 (2017) (“[The inventor] statement under 
penalty of criminal sanctions evinces a clear intent to dissuade inventors from 
knowingly filing for undeserved rights.”). 
